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Abstract. This paper reports on an ethnographic study of the use of analytics in
police work. We find that the introduction of predictive policing was followed
by the emergence of the new occupational role of “intelligence officer”. While
intelligence officers were initially intended to merely support police officers by
making sense of algorithmic outputs, they became increasingly influential in
steering police action based on their judgments. Paradoxically, despite the lar-
gely subjective nature of intelligence officers’ recommendations, police officers
started to increasingly believe in the superiority and objectivity of algorithmic
decision-making. Our work contributes to the literature on occupational change
and technology by highlighting how analytics can occasion the emergence of
intermediary occupational roles. We argue that amidst critical debates on sub-
jectivity of analytics, more attention should be paid to intermediaries – those
who are in-between designers and users – who may exert the most consequential
influence on analytics outcomes by further black-boxing the inherent inclusion
of human expertise in analytics.
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1 Introduction
Many activities of individuals’ everyday lives can now be captured, quantified, and
processed into data. As a result, organizations increasingly engage with analytics
technology – the combination of practices, skills, techniques, and technologies to
develop actionable insights from data [12] – to make work more effective, efficient, and
objective [18, 19].
In response to this so-called “data-revolution”, a growing scholarship voices critical
questions regarding the nature and consequences of analytics [11, 14, 17, 21, 25, 28,
29, 31]. These scholars point out that, due to the complex and inherently subjective
nature, introducing analytics is likely to have a significant impact on work. Conse-
quently, they call for scrutinizing the consequences of analytics for work, relations and
occupations [15, 23]. Responding to these repeated calls, we provide an empirical case
of how analytics occasions occupational transformation.
We report on an ongoing ethnographic study (currently spanning 23 months) at the
Dutch Police, following how the police develops and uses predictive analytics. In the
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police, predictive analytics is referred to as “predictive policing” – the use of analytics
to predict, for example, where and when crime is likely to occur [27]. It was introduced
in the Dutch police in 2013 and is currently used across nearly all 168 police stations in
the Netherlands. The general aim of using predictive policing is to facilitate a change in
the nature of police work towards more data-driven and efficient policing and in such a
way to prevent crime from happening.
The findings of our study indicate that the shift towards predictive policing was
followed by the emergence of a novel occupational role – “intelligence officers”.
Initially, intelligence officers were intended to support police officers in the use of
predictive policing technology, by helping them to make sense of algorithmic outputs.
However, by investing a lot of expertise into interpreting and translating algorithms and
the outputs, intelligence officers became increasingly influential and started to steer
police action. As a consequence, the practices of intelligence officers came to para-
doxically reinforce police officers’ belief in the superiority of algorithmic decisions
over human expertise. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings for
the literature on occupational change in the age of analytics and artificial intelligence.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Criticisms on the Nature of Analytics
In response to a so-called “data revolution” in organizations of all sorts, critical
questions start to be raised about the problematic nature and consequences of analytics
[9, 11, 14, 17, 21, 28, 31]. One recurrent critical argument is that the input data is
subjective, because categorization is a product of human judgment [1, 6, 14, 22]. For
example, Ribes and Jackson [29] propose that it is impossible to separate data from
data-making practices that instill data with decisions, judgments, and values dictating
what is taken into account and what is not. Pine and Liboiron [28] argue that data is not
neutral but politically influenced. Similarly, Gitelman [17] cautions that: “The imagi-
nation of data is in some measure always an act of classification, of lumping and
splitting, nesting and ranking” [15, p. 8].
A related argument is that the output of analytics is black-boxed [21, 25]. It is
generally assumed that, due to the large amount of data, analytics is not about the
“why” (causation) since indicating the “what” (correlation) is enough [18]. Newell and
Marabelli [21] question the societal impacts of this kind of knowledge production and
reflect on what it means when it is sufficient that an algorithm produces accurate
predictions, even when little is known about what led to these predictions.
Moreover, algorithmic logics are considered often too complex to be fully
understood by humans, thus triggering questions about the implications of such
algorithmic complexity. For example, in a recent conceptualization of so-called
“learning algorithms” Faraj et al. [15] reflect on the black-boxed nature of analytics
technology itself (instead of merely its output). Although algorithms always include
design choices – for example, the designer’s values, beliefs and ethical standards –
these often cannot be straightforwardly understood by human actors [13, 15]. While an
algorithm can be constructed in such a way that it might have hidden political
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consequences, such as including and excluding certain groups of people, the danger is
that design choices will likely remain hidden or can only be understood by a few,
highly specialized professionals [15].
Managing this complex, black-boxed nature of analytics therefore requires human
interpretation [14]. But scholars also highlight that the process of interpretation
necessitates careful attention, as it is contingent on cultural and organizational condi-
tions. For example, Schultze [30] demonstrates how interpretations of information
made by three occupational groups (system administrators, intelligence analysts, and
librarians) were shaped by their struggles over the legitimacy of their organizational
position. Striving to show how the individual occupations added value to the collective
process of knowledge production, the separate actors engaged in expressing, moni-
toring, and translating information. These three informing practices consequently
showed that the interpretation of information is not independent and objective but can
be driven by status struggles of individual occupational groups vis-a-vis each other and
the organization.
Introducing such a complex and subjective technology is thus likely to prompt
changes in work, relations, and occupations [15]. A relevant question that emerges is
how the use of analytics influences occupational work.
2.2 Analytics and Occupational Change
Previous research on occupational change due to technology use generally identifies
two possible scenarios for the transformation of work and occupational expertise. One
scenario involves an occupation transforming the expertise that is key to its existence,
thereby significantly reconfiguring its identity and nature of work [4, 10, 20, 24, 32].
An early account is provided by Zuboff [32], who described how the occupation of
pulp workers, faced with the introduction of information technology into the factory,
had to shift their skills from action-centered to “abstract” and “intellective”. Pulp
workers traditionally relied on direct sensing of materials, for example, defining the
quality of pulp by its look and feel. In the new situation they had to learn how to judge
the quality of materials from a distance, relying on computerized signs and symbols
and using abstract thinking and procedural reasoning. Similarly, Nelson and Irwin [20]
explain how the occupation of librarians, faced with the development of Internet
search, had to completely redefine the core of their expertise and identity. Not only did
librarians have to learn how to master the Internet search effectively, they also had to
expand the repertoire of their work by becoming experts in new domains, such as
learning how to interpret different Internet results, how to teach Internet search to
clients, and how to connect disparate web-sources. Generally, the first scenario in
current literature would thus predict that an occupation faced with new technology goes
through a considerable reconfiguration of the nature of its work, letting go of old
expertise and developing a range of new ways of working.
A second scenario concerns rising tensions or conflicts between occupations as a
result of technology introduction [3, 5, 7, 8, 26]. For example, Barrett et al. [7] describe
how the introduction of a pharmaceutical robot led to tensions in the relations between
three occupational groups in pharmacy work: pharmacists, technicians, and assistants.
While the robot allowed technicians and pharmacists to specialize in novel and exciting
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domains – such as fixing robots’ mechanical failures and engaging in cutting-edge
clinical research – it simultaneously produced strain in the relationships between
technicians and assistants; i.e., while the technicians developed new expertise and
gained authority, the robot took over many of the assistant’s tasks which had a
detrimental effect on their expertise and status. Similarly, Pachidi et al. [26] found that
the introduction of analytics in telecommunications work led to a serious clash between
two groups in the workplace: account managers and data scientists. The claim of data
scientists that they could predict customer behavior through data sources without the
need for any personal relations significantly threatened the whole raison-d’etre of
account managers, who relied on cultivating personal relations with customers as an
important source for their income. The fundamental disagreement between the two
occupational groups resulted in account managers refusing to engage with analytics
altogether, which escalated into a significant conflict between the two groups and
ultimately led to layoffs of account managers.
In sum, available research thus far would lead us to expect that occupational groups
engage in either redefining their core expertise or find themselves in conflictual rela-
tionships with other occupational groups. Our empirical study of the use of analytics in
the police points to a different scenario: that of the emergence of a new occupational
role that, in collaboration with other occupational groups, makes analytics meaningful
for work. Less is known about how such a scenario plays out in practice. In what
follows, we report on a study that identifies what happened when the police inten-
tionally introduced a new occupational role to be in charge of analytics to support
police officers in the shift to data-driven work.
3 Case Setting and Research Methodology
Our study focuses on the situated work practices of the Dutch Police, to which we
gained access in October 2016. The data collection took place in a large city in the
Netherlands in which four police stations are located, collectively housing over 700 full
time employees. We examined the activities of the use of a Dutch predictive policing
algorithm – the so-called “Criminal Anticipation System” (CAS). The algorithm was
developed in-house by a data scientist (Dennis) who joined the police in 2012. After
extensive work experience as a data-miner in the marketing industry, Dennis started to
consider his work as “not very satisfying” and wanted to apply his data preparation and
modelling skills to a more meaningful purpose. Inspired by the PredPol algorithm –
which was first introduced by the Los Angeles Police Department in 2008 [27] –
Dennis was excited about the opportunity to use his insights from the marketing
industry to infer patterns in crime behavior and predict crime chances. Dennis remained
the lead developer of CAS throughout the process of its roll-out across all Dutch police
stations.
CAS runs on a logistic regression algorithm. Influenced by the limited amount and
types of data made available to the data science department, Dennis included 50
different variables and divided them into two categories: location-specific character-
istics and crime history. Location specific characteristics are based on statistical data
that indicate, for example, the size of families, the family income, and the number of
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social securities. It also includes police data about, for example, the distance to the
closest-known burglar or the number of suspects living in a specific area. Crime history
is based on the number and spread of criminal incidents over the last three years in and
surrounding a location.
Using these variables, Dennis developed the CAS algorithm that calculates crime
chances in hot times (time blocks of four hours) and hotspots (area blocks of 125 by
125 m2). The hot times and hotspots are made visible in a heat map (see Fig. 1) with
the aim to answer two essential resource allocation questions for police management:
where to deploy police officers and at which times to do that. CAS was introduced to
the Dutch Police in 2013 in one police district. By the end of 2017 over 90 Dutch
police stations were using it and CAS is currently deployed across all police stations in
the Netherlands.
Our ethnographic fieldwork consists of observations and interviews supplemented
by archival documents such as job descriptions. All observations are conducted by the
first author. The total of 410 h of observation includes daily work at the police station,
90 briefings and 22 team meetings.
In addition, we conducted 18 formal semi-structured interviews (ranging from 25 to
120 min), including 4 interviews with data scientists, 5 interviews with police man-
agement, 3 interviews with intelligence officers, and 6 interviews with police officers.
During these interviews, participants were asked to describe the trajectory they went
through in the police, their everyday activities, and their use of CAS. We also asked
Fig. 1. An example of a CAS heat map.
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them about their view on the usefulness of such a technology for crime prevention.
Most formal interviews were voice recorded, summarized, and transcribed. In case
voice recording was not possible, detailed notes were taken during the interview and
expanded afterwards into an interview summary.
4 Findings
The findings are divided into four sections. We first explain the background and aims
of introducing predictive policing technology. Second, we describe how the intro-
duction of predictive policing occasioned the establishment of a new occupational
mandate for a group that became labelled as “intelligence officers”. Third, we explain
what expertise intelligence officers developed in practice. Fourth, we describe that
while police officers increasingly depended on the human expertise of intelligence
officers, their work paradoxically reinforced police officers’ belief in the superior value
of algorithmic decision making.
4.1 Intelligence Led Policing and Predictive Policing Technology
In 2013, the Dutch police introduced predictive policing through an internally created
algorithm called the “Criminal Anticipation System” (CAS). The introduction of CAS
was part of the “intelligence led policing” policy change, which had started in 2008.
The overall aim of this strategy transformation was to increase the awareness and
importance of working with data, including a differentiation between strategic and
operational information, improving the reporting skills of police officers, making
information available in real time, and establishing formal procedures for analyzing
existing data which otherwise remained unutilized.
As part of this approach, introducing CAS promised to achieve three specific goals.
First, knowing where to go at what time should give the police a possibility to more
efficiently schedule their resources, for example, through reducing or increasing the
number of police officers scheduled depending on predicted hot times. Second, due to
the large amount of data included, policing decisions during fieldwork – e.g., about
where to surveil to counter housebreaking – should become more objective by
replacing “gut feeling” for data-based decisions. Finally, the overall aim of introducing
CAS was to transform the traditionally reactive nature of police work into a more
proactive stance towards preventing crimes such as housebreaking or young gangs
creating nuisance. In essence, CAS should assist in preventing crime and safeguarding
the lives of police officers while on the road; it should become just as important as
every other police skills and tools. To illustrate this ambition, police manager Marga
compared the importance of using analytics to police officers’ personal gun; “they also
don’t leave their gun on the table”, she explained, referring to analytics being just as
indispensable.
To achieve these goals, CAS had to be adopted and used by police officers. Pre-
vious experiences with the introduction of new technologies had shown to police
management that, as police manager Anna recalled, merely “throwing a new tech-
nology over the fence” and expecting police officers to start using it would likely result
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in a failure of technology adoption. According to data scientist Dennis, this was even
more risky when introducing an algorithm such as CAS because of its complex and
math-based nature. Dennis believed that police officers would be unwilling to engage
deeply with deciphering and interpreting the output of CAS because of their occupa-
tional culture, referring to police officers as “people who are selected for being very
eager to act and not very eager to think”. In order to shift the police officers to a more
data-driven way of working, Dennis argued that algorithmic outputs should be
explained by “echoing what the police officers themselves say”. To do this, Dennis
argued that the “why, what and how”, or as he put it “the qualitative stuff”, had to be
added to algorithmic outputs. However, adding context required interpretation and
translation skills, which differed from data scientists’ data preparation and modelling
skills. This gap therefore had to be filled by people with a different kind of expertise.
These people became so-called “intelligence officers”.
4.2 The Intelligence Officer as a New Occupational Role
To fill the gap between data science and police skills, data scientists and police
management wondered if they could introduce an intermediary who could support the
work of police officers by making algorithmic output meaningful for police work.
During the time of the introduction of CAS in 2013, there was a group within the police
– referred to as “information officers” – that seemed most logical to take on this role
since they were already working with information, albeit in a different way. Tradi-
tionally, the work of an information officer included supporting police management and
criminal investigation by gathering various types of information. Former information
officer Ben recalled what this role involved:
I have assisted a lot in murder investigations. There you would get various work orders like
‘map this’, or ‘figure that out’, or ‘how do the families relate’. These kinds of things. Or
business relations. […] It was about delving into all different internal sources. You didn’t really
have access to Internet back then.
Due to their focus on information gathering, information officers had in-depth
knowledge about where data – such as crime numbers, suspect data, or information
about criminal networks – could be found in police databases. However, their work was
regarded as relatively low-status, because information officers were not required to
interpret the information they found. Instead, as data scientist Dennis explained, they
would “collect all data, print it, put a staple in it and give it to their boss”. Information
officers were also sometimes described as “not very assertive”, keen on “avoiding
confrontations”, used to “following orders” and doing “kind of boring work” (data
scientist Dennis). Moreover, the information officer position was informally regarded
as a back-office department for police officers who came to be unfit to continue
working in the field. In essence, the information officers’ position was considered as a
“shelter for police officers with back problems or illnesses” (intelligence officer Ben).
Despite their relatively low status, the data scientists acknowledged the information
officers’ expertise with police databases and reasoned that this occupational group
could be well-equipped to take on additional tasks that emerged with the introduction
of predictive policing. Instead of just gathering information according to predefined
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requests, information officers were to take on novel responsibilities, such as interpreting
algorithmic output, summarizing it for police officers and making suggestions of
potential actions. This way, information officers were required to “add qualitative stuff”
to algorithms and to provide back-office support to police officers for using algorithmic
outputs. Using the example housebreaking, Dennis explained what that would involve:
You could say: ‘We have quite a drug problem over here [in this neighborhood]’. Then you
could wonder: ‘Maybe it [housebreaking prediction] is because of the junkies?’ Well, junkies
don’t prepare much, so maybe it is just very easy to burgle there. Maybe the houses have bad
locks so you can enter with a simple trick. That kind of information should be retrieved by the
information officer. […] Then we can think of what to do about it. As police, we are of course
very inclined to just send a car there [for surveillance] but it could be that this is completely
useless and that they should do something totally different.
Reflecting the shift in the nature of information officers’ work, the new job title
“intelligence officer” and a new job description were introduced in 2013. The novel job
description was significantly longer and more focused on interpreting tasks, rather than
the operational tasks that characterized the prior work of information officers. For
example, the responsibilities now included so-called “data editing” requirements which
involved making sense of the data and adding context to it. Intelligence officer Ben
explains his perspective on the transformation:
Back in the days, when we received a crime notification, we gathered all information and
handed that package over [to police officers]. But I guess that when you gathered and read all
that information, you can also interpret it, right? You can confirm or refute such a notification,
or you can add some advice like: ‘maybe this and that requires further investigation’, you know.
Information is more and more being interpreted.
As a result of the shifting nature of their work, intelligence officers started to gain
in-depth expertise about interpreting and working with algorithmic output. This
expertise centered around meaning-making practices, on which we elaborate below.
4.3 Intelligence Work in Practice
Although intelligence officers were initially intended to merely provide back-office
support to police officers for using algorithmic outputs, they quickly discovered that
working with CAS required more than simply “adding qualitative stuff”, as was
imagined by the data scientists. In practice, the algorithmic output was highly complex;
for example, selecting hotspots and hot times required comparing between different
graphs and maps. It was also voluminous, for example, the heatmap regularly showed
entire districts covered in hotspots. The outputs often seemed nonsensical, for example,
predictions of car burglary were shown in areas where cars were not allowed. And
finally, the algorithm remained black-boxed, so the intelligence officers often com-
plained that they did not understand the output because there was no transparency
about which variables were most important for predicting hotspots or hot times. In
order to make algorithmic outputs legible and meaningful for police work, the intel-
ligence officers had to go beyond just “adding qualitative stuff” and slowly started to
learn how to unpack the specific features of the algorithm.
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Besides unpacking, intelligence officers also had to make sure that police officers
would be able to accept the algorithmic outputs and were actively considering how to
best integrate CAS outputs into police work. They reasoned that it was important not to
overload the police officers with too many tasks for covering hotspots and hot times,
because a large part of police work still consisted of responding to unexpected crimes
not included in CAS, such as car accidents. Indeed, as commander Rudy emphasized,
police officers had limited resources available: “Look, we [police] cannot handle
everything [all crimes], but let’s at least make a choice and set a priority like ‘we will
certainly handle this [type of crime], because we think it is now important”.
Moreover, intelligence officers also anticipated that in their recommendations to
police officers they should vary the hotspots and types of crime they introduced, so that
the predictions would not look too repetitive and would keep the police officers
interested in using them. For example, during one of the shifts, intelligence officer
Louisa was trying to decide which hotspots to recommend for sending police officers to
surveil against housebreaking. The algorithm had produced two hotspots that otherwise
never showed up, and two “regular” hotspots that were common crime spots in the
district. Louisa was not sure which hotspots to select: the new or the common ones?
She asked Ben and together they decided to select the new ones. They reasoned that the
police officers would get bored if the hotspots stayed the same and would be more
excited to go into a new neighborhood. According to Ben, variety increases the chance
that “police officers take hotspots seriously” (observation notes, 13-11-2017).
Finally, to make algorithmic outputs “echo what police officers themselves say”,
intelligence officers figured that it was important to make outputs appear closer to the
context of police work. They figured this would be possible by including additional
background information, such as suspects or information about surrounding neigh-
borhoods. As police commander Rudy explained this viewpoint from the police offi-
cers’ perspective:
If you keep the goals [of the algorithmic output] too broad, then police officers will let it go too
fast. If you dare to add possible suspects, then they will quickly start searching. Then they’ll
better scan the surroundings, like: ‘Hey, we see someone strolling over there’. I think the
concreter you are, the more feeling police officers will have for it [the output].
With the aim to make algorithmic outputs meaningful for police work, intelligence
officers thus went beyond simply “supporting” police work. Instead, their decisions
started to steer the work of police officers. Specifically, because working with algo-
rithmic output required reducing the number of hotspots and hot times presented to
police officers, it meant that intelligence officers in fact prioritized certain types of
crimes according to their own judgement. Moreover, because they had to combine the
results of their interpretation into a single succinct PowerPoint slide to be shown to
police officers, this significantly simplified algorithmic outputs by compressing a messy
picture into a seemingly clean and objective result. Finally, because intelligence officers
also included information from other databases, such as possible suspects, this effec-
tively gave the impression that contextual information was also part of the algorithmic
output.
In sum, while intelligence officers’ work was intended to merely support police
officers in using algorithmic outputs, in practice they shifted into exerting a much
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bigger influence on how police work should be organized and where priorities should
fall. Intelligence officers started to recognize this growing importance as well: “Most of
the time, at least for us, police officers do not know what they need. And then I think
‘well, I know what you need to do because I see a big problem in this neighborhood, so
you should go there’. So then I tell them what they should do” (intelligence officer
Wendy).
4.4 Police Officers’ Perspective
Over time, the influence of intelligence officers became acknowledged by police offi-
cers and their activities were increasingly incorporated into police routines. For
example, at the end of the first year of our observations, a new practice was established
that required the police commander to meet with an intelligence officer each morning
before the briefing. During this meeting the intelligence officer instructed the com-
mander about the crime types, hotspots, and hot times, including background infor-
mation, that they deemed most important to communicate and emphasize to the team.
As intelligence officer Ben explains:
We give an interpretation [to the algorithmic output] so that police officers can do something
with it. In other words: ‘It is this for these reasons’. You can also give them advice, like: ‘I
would focus on that or that person’ or ‘I wouldn’t do anything about that [crime] because it’s
way too unpredictable and you can’t do anything about it’.
Over the course of the two years of our fieldwork, intelligence officers acquired
even more influence over police work. For example, they became the most important
source for formulating strategically-focused work assignments – “to-do” lists for police
action which are used for weekly guidance of police fieldwork. Previously, compiling a
“to-do list” for police work was performed by local police officers, responsible for
specific neighborhoods. With the use of predictive policing and CAS, the local police
officers’ to-do lists started to be viewed as too idiosyncratic; a messy and random list of
activities. Gradually, the responsibility for making more strategically-focused work
assignments was placed in the hands of police management, who embraced predictive
policing and made intelligence officers their central source of input. Consequently,
police actions became de facto driven by the intelligence officers’ judgments and
interpretations of CAS.
Furthermore, police officers often accepted suggestions of intelligence officers
without questioning their reasoning. An example of a recent briefing discussion
illustrates this. For one of the shifts, the CAS prediction indicated a high level of
nuisance. Considering this as an important prediction, intelligence officer Louisa found
a linkable suspect in the police databases and had manually added him to the slide to be
shown during the briefing. Upon seeing the slide, a discussion arose about the suit-
ability of that suspect. A couple of police officers claimed that this specific suspect was
a much “tougher guy” and said that it was ridiculous to keep an eye on him “merely as
a suspect of nuisance”. The commander overruled the discussion by saying that this
information came from the intelligence department, so there would “surely be a rea-
sonable link”. The other police officers acknowledged that and did not further question
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the suspect’s suitability. The briefing ended without further ado (observation notes,
June 2018).
One of the reasons for this ready acceptance was that police officers seemed
impressed by the complexity of algorithms. “What I’ve seen and what I heard from
[intelligence officer] Eva is that CAS includes so many variables, that machine must
really be a monster!” said police officer Michael. As a consequence, police officers
believed that they might not be “smart” enough to question such complex algorithms
and assumed that it was better if they just accepted the output. As police officer Harry
explained:
“[W]hen I really think about crime predictions, then I wonder: is a burglar really influenced by
something that can make us predict where burglary will happen? Or is it just his target area?
But I shouldn’t think too much about that, because I don’t have the answer. I’m quite a follower
in that sense. I trust that the people who really understand this thought about these things.”
Even though it did not always make sense to them, police officers started to
increasingly accept that crimes can be systematically explained through the use of data
and algorithms, which they assumed transcended their level of understanding. Police
officer Jay explained his trust in the expertise invested into the technology, without
exploring the embedded assumptions or doubting the legitimacy: “I would say that it
must come from somewhere. It won’t be implemented just out of the blue.”
Corresponding with their belief in the usefulness of algorithms, police officers
started to regard their work as having higher value when they followed the advice
generated by the predictions:
I feel useless when I’m just driving around without seeing anything. […] If something [CAS]
tells me that the chances are high that a burglary will happen over there, well that’s what we
want! Catching thieves or at least prevent crime. So I will go for it! (Police officer Harry).
Police officer Jimmy showed a similar perspective: “With the right information I
can make the right decisions” he said, “and making the right decisions gives me a
purpose.” Moreover, mainly driven by the growing respect for the algorithmic rec-
ommendations the intelligence officers provided them, police officers also started to
deem the insights and expertise associated with algorithms as superior to their own
judgment, viewing the latter as “subjective” and “blind”. Police officer Harry compared
the recommendations of a local police officer with the ones generated based on data:
I think a local police officer is also somehow subjective and has his own agenda. He may think
that some type of crime is particularly important, but perhaps this is not at all what the data
shows. […] Maybe the data points at something completely different [some other type of crime
in another part of town]. I don’t think we should blindly trust the local police officer’s
perspective.
In sum, police officers gradually embraced the growing influence intelligence
officers came to exert over their work through the use of predictive policing. Even
though intelligence officers were initially introduced to provide relatively simple back-
office support to police officers, their work in practice came to include many inter-
pretations and judgments to make algorithmic outputs meaningful for police work.
Because police officers believed in an incomprehensible complexity of algorithms, they
argued that they were not smart enough to understand algorithms, viewed their own
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tacit expertise as inferior to data-based recommendations, and eventually accepted the
algorithmic outputs presented to them without questioning its reasoning. As a result,
the new occupational role paradoxically reinforced the police officers’ belief in the
superiority of algorithmic decisions.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study aimed at understanding what happens to occupational work upon the
introduction of analytics. Our findings offer three contributions to existing literature on
occupational change due to technology use and the critical debate on nature of ana-
lytics. First, we show that analytics occasions the emergence of an intermediary
occupational role that takes charge of analytics and unpacks specific algorithmic fea-
tures. Prior literature on occupational change either focuses on the skill transformation
of separate occupations [20, 32], or on the resulting tensions and conflicts when
multiple occupational groups are involved [7, 26]. We extend prior literature by
showing the possibility of the rise of an intermediary occupational role in-between
analytics designers and users. Thereby, we respond to calls for a relational perspective
on occupations [2].
Second, our study shows that analytics is not only constructed by the design
choices of its creators, but is also iteratively shaped by the expert work of intermediary
occupations who take on the task of unpacking the features of algorithms to make them
usable. We thereby respond to calls for disentangling analytics technology [14, 15, 23].
We extend the current critical debate regarding the nature of analytics [6, 11, 17, 21,
22, 25, 26, 28, 29] by giving a detailed explanation of analytics in action by high-
lighting how different occupational groups perform work with analytics.
Third, our findings indicate that engaging in such “unpacking” practices is con-
sequential for the relations between occupational groups. As such, identifying the role
of intermediaries in analytics at work has important implications for the distribution of
power between occupations. While prior literature acknowledged the growing power of
data scientists as the designers of analytics who can determine what counts as
knowledge and what not [15, 16, 26], we highlight that the growing power and steering
influence of intermediaries also warrants attention. Growing legitimacy and use of
algorithms is making this changing power distribution even more salient.
To conclude, we have shown how the introduction of a new occupational role
intended to add interpretations to algorithmic outputs to support existing work also has
a counterintuitive consequence. While on the one hand, unpacking the features and
making algorithmic outputs meaningful for work by adding interpretations and human
judgment encouraged the use of analytics, it also paradoxically reinforced police
officers’ belief in the superiority of algorithmic decisions over human expertise. In the
long run, the danger of creating a new occupational role that interprets and unpacks
analytics to make it readily available for its users is that specifically these practices
might even further black-box the inherent inclusion of human expertise.
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